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STRIKING TOBACCO OUT OF BASEBALL:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SMOKELESS
TOBACCO BANS AT SPORTS STADIUMS
INTRODUCTION
Baseball is America’s pastime and has been watched by hundreds of
millions of fans throughout the past century and a half.1  Since the
inception of Major League Baseball (MLB), smokeless tobacco has
been associated with the sport.2  However, lawmakers are attempting
to abolish the use of smokeless tobacco during baseball games by
MLB players.3  Beginning in 2015, cities and states began banning
smokeless tobacco use in sports stadiums.4  As of February 2017, Chi-
cago, New York City, San Francisco, Milwaukee, Boston, Washington,
and St. Louis have enacted regulations prohibiting the use of smoke-
less tobacco in sports stadiums.5  Council members and legislators
targeted MLB stadiums because approximately thirty percent of MLB
players use smokeless tobacco.6  Since baseball is a widely televised
1. See Jo Craven McGinty, Popularity Contest: Baseball vs. Football, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 10,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/popularity-contest-baseball-vs-football-1428679449; Jonathan
Mahler, Is the Game Over?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/
opinion/sunday/is-the-game-over.html.
2. Brian Palmer, Why Do So Many Baseball Players Chew Tobacco?, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/11/why_do_so_many_baseball_
players_chew_tobacco.html (“In the mid-19th century—baseball’s formative years—chewing to-
bacco enormously popular in the United States.”).
3. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(b) (West 2016) (“A person shall not use or
possess a smokeless tobacco product at any time on the playing field . . . .”); S.F., CAL., HEALTH
CODE, § 19O.3(b) (2015) (“No owner, manager, or operator of a ‘sports arena’ . . . shall know-
ingly or intentionally permit, and no person on the premises shall engage in the use of tobacco
products in any enclosed or open part of the sports arena.”); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 5,
§ 17-503.1 (2016) (“Using smokeless tobacco is prohibited at all times at sports arenas and recre-
ational areas if seating or standing room is assigned by issuance of tickets for any event held at
such arenas and areas.”); CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE 7-32-032(a) (2016) (“No person shall use
smokeless tobacco at an event for professional, collegiate, high school or organized amateur
sporting events.”).
4. See Palmer, supra note 2.
5. St. Louis Bans Smokeless Tobacco at Busch, other venues, FOX SPORTS (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:59
PM), http://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/st-louis-bans-smokeless-tobacco-at-busch-other-ven
ues-020317.
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(a)(1) (West 2016) (“The Legislature finds and
declares that the use of smokeless tobacco products by professional baseball players is a matter
of statewide interest and concern.”); Joe DeLessio, A Surprisingly High Number of Major
League Baseball Players Still Chew Tobacco, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://nymag
.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/how-many-major-leaguers-use-smokeless-tobacco.html (“A Ma-
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sport, many children see their role models using the substance.7  Ac-
cordingly, lawmakers found this to be a public health concern and en-
acted laws and ordinances banning the use of smokeless tobacco in
sports stadiums.8  Many legislators consider the elimination of tobacco
use essential because tobacco products cause health problems, most
importantly, heart disease and cancer.9
This is not the first time lawmakers have attempted to regulate to-
bacco due to its association with such health problems.  Regulations
enacted in the 1960s helped reduce smoking from 42.4% in 1965 to
just 24.7% in 1997.10  However, tobacco regulation is only one tool
that can contribute to decreased tobacco use.11  Education, policy
changes, increased understanding of the costs of tobacco, taxation,
and “prevention and cessation programs” can also be used to decrease
tobacco use.12  Nevertheless, smokeless tobacco use among high
school teenagers, especially high school athletes, increased by more
than eleven percent from 2001 to 2013.13  According to many oppo-
nents of smokeless tobacco, specifically the Knock Tobacco Out of the
Park Campaign, the use of smokeless tobacco by  MLB players signifi-
cantly increases the likelihood that high school athletes will use the
substance.14  Professional baseball players have used smokeless to-
bacco since the sport’s inception in the late 1800s,15 so the recent in-
crease in smokeless tobacco use cannot simply be blamed on current
MLB player use.16
jor League Baseball spokesperson says the league has seen the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
estimate, and believes the figure is indeed around 30 percent.”).
7. Seth Gruen, Lights, Camera, Acrimony: Baseball’s First Televised Game Changed Every-
thing, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/lights-camera-
acrimony-baseballs-first-televised-game-changed-everything-20140826; Journal of the Proceed-
ings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, vol. 1, at 19,436 (Mar. 16, 2016).
8. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
9. Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/health_effects/effects_cig_smoking/ (last visited
Dec. 26, 2016); Smoking and Respiratory Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/50th-anniversary/pdfs/fs_smoking_respirato
ry_508.pdf  (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).
10. Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Tobacco Use—United States, 1900–1999, CTRS.




13. Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Chicago Baseball Becomes Tobacco-
Free; Wrigley Game Tomorrow is City’s Historic First (July 14, 2016).
14. Id.
15. See DeLessio, supra note 6; see also Palmer, supra note 2. R
16. See Amanda Woerner, Increasing Popularity of Smokeless Tobacco Poses Cancer Risk to
Young Men, FOX NEWS (July 2, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2014/07/02/smokeless-to-
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According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), the factors that contribute to tobacco use by America’s youth
include: social and physical environment, biological and genetic fac-
tors, mental health, personal perceptions, low socioeconomic status,
accessibility, availability, and the price of tobacco products.17  An-
other, and arguably better, explanation for the increase in smokeless
tobacco use is that states have failed to provide proper education on
the negative health effects of smokeless tobacco.18
Likewise, MLB itself has failed to implement strategies aimed at
reducing the use of smokeless tobacco.  MLB and MLB players have
failed in their efforts to reach an agreement over whether to ban
smokeless tobacco use during games.19  However, in a collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) signed in November 2016, both parties
agreed to ban smokeless tobacco use by any player who has not
played a game in the majors.20  Despite this agreement, the smokeless
tobacco regulations are still prevalent because many MLB players are
still allowed to use smokeless tobacco during games.21  This Comment
will focus on how the recent regulations affect these MLB players.
In Part I, this Comment will detail the history of tobacco regulation
in the United States.  Additionally, Part I will discuss the differences
in the health effects between cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.  Part
II will argue that the smokeless tobacco bans in sports stadiums vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause and impinge on a player’s right to
freedom of expression under the First Amendment.  Finally, Part III
will propose a more effective and efficient way of promoting a tobacco
free environment without violating a player’s right to use smokeless
tobacco.
bacco-rates-remain-steady-in-us-as-cigarette-use-declines.html; see also, Press Release, Cam-
paign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 13.
17. Youth and Tobacco Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc
.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/youth_data/tobacco_use/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
18. State Funding for Tobacco Prevention & Cessation Programs, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://
www.lungusa2.org/slati/reports/funding-for-tobacco-prevention-and-cessation-programs-fact-
sheet-fy13.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
19. Lee Gilgan, The Hidden Ball Trick; Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Attempts to Hide Tobacco Use by Players, 13 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 41, 45 (2015).
20. Liz Roscher, The Biggest Changes in Baseball’s New CBA Include World Series Home-
field and Smokeless Tobacco, YAHOO (Dec. 1, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/
the-biggest-changes-in-baseballs-new-cba-include-160001525.html.
21. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 4 26-APR-18 8:34
796 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:793
II. THE HISTORY OF TOBACCO REGULATION AND THE HEALTH
EFFECTS RELATED TO ITS USE
Subsection A discusses the history of tobacco regulation in the
United States and how that regulation has changed over time.  Sub-
section B outlines the differences between cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco.  Subsection C addresses prior attempts by MLB and the
MLB Player’s Association (MLBPA) to regulate smokeless tobacco
use.  Subsection D discusses the reasons why legislators have banned
smokeless tobacco in sports stadiums.  Lastly, Subsection E discusses
the impact that education has on the percentage of individuals that
use tobacco.
A. History of Tobacco Regulation in the United States
In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act (FCLAA) after realizing the substantial adverse health
effects that smoking posed to persons in the United States.22  The
FCLAA required manufacturers to place warning labels on cigarette
packaging to inform the general public of the adverse health effects
caused by smoking.23  Numerous state and federal regulations fol-
lowed, but it was not until the late 1990s that states passed laws
prohibiting smoking in public places.24  Legislators enacted these laws,
in part, to protect non-smokers from the effects of secondhand smoke
in confined places.25  The push to ban smoking in bars and restaurants
occurred in part because both places are “an integral part of society”
and nonsmokers should be able to enjoy those places without being
exposed to secondhand smoke.26
22. Selected Actions of the U.S. Government Regarding Regulations of Tobacco Sales, Market-
ing, and Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
data_statistics/by_topic/policy/legislation/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) (noting that labels on ciga-
rettes were required to include the warning: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to
Your Health”); L.C. Friedman et al., Tobacco Industry Use of Personal Responsibility Rhetoric in
Public Relations and Litigation: Disguising Freedom to Blame as Freedom of Choice, 105 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 250, 250 (2015).
23. Robert C. Carlsen, Common Law Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings
Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 754, 754 (1986).
24. See Mark J. Horvick, Examining the Underlying Purposes of Municipal and Statewide
Smoking Bans, 80 IND. L.J. 923, 923 (2005) (stating that after California banned smoking in bars
and restaurants, many other states began prohibiting smoking in bars and restaurants).
25. Hills v. Stewart, No. 98-15466, 1999 WL 970804, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1999); Johnson v.
Saffle, No. 98-6225, 1998 WL 792071, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 1998); Webber v. Crabtree, 158
F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998); Brashear v. Simms, 138 F. Supp. 2d 693, 694 (D. Md. 2001).
26. Horvick, supra note 24, at 926.
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Following this movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Presi-
dent Barack Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and To-
bacco Control Act (the Act), which became effective June 2009.27
The resulting regulations prohibit anyone under the age of eighteen
from purchasing tobacco and also requires retailers to seek photo
identification from anyone twenty-six years old or younger.28  Addi-
tionally, these regulations prohibit the distribution of free samples of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.29  Legislators thought these changes
were important to “improving the public health of current and future
generations of Americans.”30  While the Act set a minimum age of
eighteen years old for an individual to purchase tobacco, some cities
and states have passed statutes and ordinances that require individuals
purchasing tobacco to be at least twenty-one years old.31  In 2015, Ha-
waii became the first state to raise the smoking age from eighteen to
twenty-one.32  California soon followed suit and passed several restric-
tive tobacco laws, which included raising the smoking age from eigh-
teen to twenty-one and expanding prohibited smoking areas.33
At the same time that these laws were being introduced, many of
the same states and cities passed ordinances prohibiting the use of
smokeless tobacco in sports stadiums.34  Some of the ordinances were
limited exclusively to baseball stadiums, while others banned the use
of smokeless tobacco in all sports stadiums within city limits.  For ex-
ample, in 2015, California became the first state to prohibit the use of
27. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31 (2009); see
also Matthew Herington, Tobacco Regulation in the United States: New Opportunities and Chal-
lenges, 23 HEALTH LAW 1, 14 (2011).
28. Herington, supra note 27, at 14–15 .
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Andrew Blake, Hawaii Becomes First State to Raise Legal Smoking Age to 21, WASH.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/5/hawaii-becomes-first-
state-raise-legal-smoking-age/. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1258 (2016); see also Nereida
Moreno, Minimum Age to Buy Cigarettes in Chicago Increases to 21 Starting Friday, CHI. TRIB.
(June 30, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-smoking-age-increase-
met-20160630-story.html (reporting that since 2005, more than 100 cities have passed laws rais-
ing the tobacco age from 18 to 21).
32. Blake, supra note 31; HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1258(1) (2016) (“It shall be unlawful to sell
or furnish a tobacco product in any shape or form or an electronic smoking device to a person
under twenty-one years of age.”).
33. Patrick McGreevy, California’s Smoking Age Raised from 18 to 21 Under Bills Signed By
Gov. Brown, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-jerry-brown-
smoking-bills-20160504-story.html (“The bills were approved during a special session on health-
care and will effective sooner—June 9—than other bills, which take effect Jan. 1, 2017.”).
34. City Council Raises Chicago Smoking Age to 21, Bans Chewing Tobacco at Ballparks, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:37 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/03/16/city-council-raises-chi-
cago-smoking-age-to-21-bans-chewing-tobacco-at-ballparks/.
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smokeless tobacco in all major and minor league stadiums.35  Mean-
while, New York City, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles, and San Fran-
cisco all passed laws prohibiting the use of smokeless tobacco in sports
stadiums within city limits.36  The California statute’s prohibition is
only limited to baseball players on the field.37  However, the New
York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco ordinances go fur-
ther and restrict fan use of smokeless tobacco.38  Chicago’s city ordi-
nance explicitly states that “[n]o person . . . at an event site” may use
smokeless tobacco while in attendance.39  Similarly, New York City
prohibits the use of smokeless tobacco “at all times at sports
arenas.”40
B. The Differences in Health Effects of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco
There are substantial differences between the health effects of
smoking cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.41  The CDC estimates that
cigarette smoking causes more than 480,000 deaths annually, including
approximately 41,000 deaths due to secondhand smoke.42  Although
smoking may not result in a person’s death, it greatly increases the
likelihood of an early death for both men and women.43  Compared to
the average non-smoker, male smokers are seventeen times more
likely to die from bronchitis or emphysema and twenty-three times
more likely to die from trachea, lung, or bronchus cancer.44  Com-
pared to the average non-smoker, female smokers are twelve times
more likely to die from bronchitis, emphysema, lung cancer, trachea
cancer, and bronchus cancer.45  Smoking related deaths in the United
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(a) (West 2016); Chewing Tobacco to be Banned
in MLB Parks Under New California Law, ESPN (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.espn.com/mlb/
story/_/id/13876942/california-enacts-law-prohibit-smokeless-tobacco-state-ballparks.
36. William Weinbaum & Michele Steele, MLB: Violators of New Tobacco Laws Face Base-
ball Penalties, ESPN (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/15064469/violators-
new-tobacco-laws-face-baseball-penalties.
37. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(a) (West 2016).
38. Azadeh Ansari, New York Banning Smokeless Tobacco at Ballparks, Other Venues, CNN
(Apr. 6, 2016, 6:49PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/06/health/new-york-smokeless-tobacco-ban/
index.html.
39. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE 7-32-032(a) (2016).
40. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 5, § 17-503.1 (2016).




43. Mary Rhodan, Even Smoking One Cigarette a Day Can Lead to Early Death, TIME (Dec.
5, 2016), http://time.com/4590517/smoking-death-lung-cancer.
44. See Tobacco-Related Mortality, supra note 41.
45. Id.
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States account for more deaths than HIV, illegal drug use, alcohol use,
motor vehicle accidents, and firearm-related incidents combined.46
Along with the substantial amount of deaths associated with cigarette
smoke, smoking can also lead to heart disease, strokes, lung disease,
cancer in almost every part of the body, gum disease, reduced fertility,
rheumatoid arthritis, and several other serious health conditions.47
Not only do cigarettes harm the smoker, they also harm those
around the smoker by way of secondhand smoke.48  There are over
7,000 chemicals that a person inhales due to secondhand smoke, 70 of
which are cancerous.49  According to the CDC, secondhand smoke
has caused 2.5 million deaths in the United States since 1964.50  It can
lead to cardiovascular disease, lung cancer, and sudden infant death
syndrome.51  More importantly, children are the most affected from
the inhalation of secondhand smoke.52  Children who encounter
secondhand smoke are more likely to get sick and develop lung
infections.53
Smokeless tobacco “includes chewing tobacco, dip, snuff, and betel
quid.”54  Similar to smoking, smokeless tobacco has several adverse
health effects on the user.55  Unlike smoking, smokeless tobacco
health effects are almost exclusively limited to oral disease.56  How-
ever, recent studies tend to show that smokeless tobacco can cause
heart disease and strokes.57  In addition, the use of smokeless tobacco
can lead to esophageal, mouth, and pancreatic cancer.58  Even though
smokeless tobacco has adverse health effects, it is “slightly less dan-
gerous than smoking” because tar does not enter lungs while using the
46. See Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, supra note 9. R
47. Id.
48. See Health Effects of Secondhand Smoke, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/health_effects/ (last
visited Nov. 3, 2016) (explaining that secondhand smoke is a “combination of smoke from the
burning end of a cigarette and the smoke breathed out by smokers.”).
49. Health Risks of Secondhand Smoke, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/
cancercauses/tobaccocancer/secondhand-smoke (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
50. Health Effects of Secondhand Smoke, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. See AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Smokeless Tobacco and Your Health, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., http://be
tobaccofree.hhs.gov/health-effects/smokeless-health/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
56. Micah L. Berman, Tobacco Litigation Without Smoke? Cigarette Companies in the Smoke-
less Tobacco Industry, 11 J. HEALTH CARE & POL’Y 7, 10 (2008) (“Although smokeless tobacco
is clearly a threat to oral hygiene and increases the risk of oral cancer . . . it is also undoubtedly
less deadly than smoking.”).
57. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV, supra note 54.
58. Id.
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substance.59  However, it is not considered a safe alternative to smok-
ing due to the previously mentioned health effects.60
C. The History of Smokeless Tobacco Use in Major League
Baseball and the New Collective Bargaining Agreement
Recent legislation attempts to ban smokeless tobacco, which has
been a part of Major League Baseball since the late 1800s.61  In the
1870s and 1880s, some players used smokeless tobacco spit to moisten
their gloves in order to improve their play on the field.62  Others used
smokeless tobacco rather than cigarettes because cigarettes were
thought to contribute to “hitting slumps” and “fatigue.”63  Even after
Babe Ruth, arguably the greatest baseball player of all-time, died
from throat cancer in 1948 after years of smoking and chewing to-
bacco, many players continued to use smokeless tobacco.64  In 1987,
after over one-hundred years of Major League Baseball, half of MLB
players used smokeless tobacco.65
Today, approximately thirty percent of MLB players still use
smokeless tobacco.66  The decline in use is largely attributed to actions
taken by MLB.  For instance, in 1993, MLB prohibited the use of
smokeless tobacco in the Minor Leagues, which lead to a decline of
use in the Major Leagues.67  Many Minor League players quit due to
the large fine they faced if they violated the league’s policy.68  Addi-
tionally, in 2011, MLB took another step toward eliminating the pro-
motion of smokeless tobacco products by prohibiting players from
being interviewed while using it.69
The number of MLB players using smokeless tobacco is likely to
decrease further because the new CBA prohibits any incoming players
59. Mack Lemouse, Chewing Tobacco vs. Cigarettes, HEALTH GUIDANCE http://www.health
guidance.org/entry/15730/1/Chewing-Tobacco-VS-Cigarettes.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
60. Id.
61. Palmer, supra note 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Jason Diamond, Why Baseball Has Never Been Able to Quit Tobacco, MEN’S J., http://
www.mensjournal.com/adventure/races-sports/why-baseball-has-never-been-able-to-quit-tobac
co-20140820. (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
65. Jack Moore, How Major League Baseball Got Addicted to Tobacco, THE WEEK (Apr. 3,
2016), http://theweek.com/articles/615457/how-major-league-baseball-got-addicted-tobacco.
66. Id.
67. Mychael Urban, Tobacco Use in Baseball on the Decline, MLB (July 29, 2009), http://m.
mlb.com/news/article/3037249/.
68. Id. Fines start at $100 and go as high as $1,000. Id.
69. See Diamond, supra note 64.
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from using smokeless tobacco during games.70  In November 2016, the
MLB and MLBPA agreed to ban smokeless tobacco for any player
who has not played a game in the Major Leagues.71  Although it does
not have an impact on all MLB players, proponents argue it will sub-
stantially decrease the prevalence of smokeless tobacco use in the Ma-
jor Leagues.72
Some major league players have a difficult time quitting the sub-
stance because they began using it at a young age.73  For example,
both Madison Bumgarner and Jake Peavy, pitchers for the San Fran-
cisco Giants, began using the substance in fifth grade and continue to
use it “pretty much all the time.”74  Quitting a lifelong habit is ex-
tremely difficult, especially considering the addictive nature of the nic-
otine contained in smokeless tobacco.75  Miguel Montero, former
catcher for the Chicago Cubs, also finds it difficult to quit due to its
addictive nature.76  Although the ban came as a disappointment to
many, some players are embracing the ban as an opportunity to quit,
which will result in less MLB players using smokeless tobacco.77
D. Why The Smokeless Tobacco Bans Were Enacted
MLB players have always been permitted to use smokeless tobacco
while playing, but they are now prohibited by law from doing so in
70. R.J. Anderson, MLB Bans Smokeless Chewing Tobacco for New Players in New CBA,
CBS SPORTS (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-bans-smokeless-chewing-
tobacco-for-new-players-in-new-cba/.  Since Tony Gwynn’s death, numerous players quit using
smokeless tobacco. Id.
71. Report: CBA Includes Smokeless Tobacco Ban for New Players, ESPN (Dec. 4, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/18177667/cba-includes-smokeless-tobacco-ban-new-mlb-
players (“Players new to the majors won’t be able to dip next year without risk of penalty . . . .”).
72. Id.
73. See Erin Flynn, Madison Bumgarner, Jake Peavy Have Been Dipping Since Fifth Grade,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.si.com/mlb/2015/08/04/san-francisco-giants-
madison-bumgarner-dipping-fifth-grade.
74. Id.
75. Why Is It So Hard to Quit Smokeless Tobacco?, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://staging.cancer
.org/healthy/stay-away-from-tobacco/guide-to-quitting-smokeless-tobacco/quitting.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2017) (reporting that nicotine, found in tobacco, is as addictive as heroin or cocaine).
76. Jesse Rogers, Cubs Not Happy With Chicago’s Smokeless Tobacco Ban, ESPN (Mar. 16,
2016), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/14990087/chicago-cubs-bristle-city-smokeless-to-
bacco-ban (reporting that Miguel Montero’s expression of disappointment came after Chicago
passed the ban on smokeless tobacco).
77. Id.  Miguel Montero hopes the ban will ultimately help him quit. Id.; see also Tim Rohan,
A Baseball Habit Begins to Feel the Pinch, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/04/sports/baseball/a-baseball-habit-begins-to-feel-the-pinch.html?_r=0 (indicating that
Madison Bumgarner and C.C. Sabathia, a pitcher for the New York Yankees, said they would
quit following the ban).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 10 26-APR-18 8:34
802 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:793
some cities and states.78  In 2015, California became the first state to
prohibit the use of smokeless tobacco by players during games.79  The
ban specifically targeted the MLB because they have failed, until re-
cently, to establish policies that prohibit the use of the substance dur-
ing the course of play.80  The California legislature decided to address
the issue because it found that the use of smokeless tobacco by MLB
players exposes children and teenagers to an unhealthy substance.81
The California legislature’s reasoning mirrors that of the Tobacco-
Free Baseball Campaign, which was established for the purpose of rid-
ding baseball of smokeless tobacco use.82  The Knock Tobacco Out of
the Park Campaign provides four main reasons that baseball should
be tobacco free: (1) “smokeless tobacco is harmful to health,” (2) “too
many kids are using smokeless tobacco,” (3) “tobacco use in baseball
reinforces tobacco marketing,” and (4) “professional baseball players
are role models for youth.”83  Elaborating on these reasons, the Cam-
paign points to the decline in smoking, while “smokeless tobacco use
has remained troublingly steady.”84  The campaign asserts that use of
smokeless tobacco products by MLB players sets a “terrible example”
and “promote[s] a product” with several adverse health effects.85
One of the main reasons cities and states passed laws banning
smokeless tobacco is because the MLB Players Union refused to ac-
cept any policy banning the use of smokeless tobacco.86  Almost all
players in the MLB refused to accept any agreement banning the sub-
stance because they are legally permitted to use it outside of base-
ball.87  After Chicago banned the use of smokeless tobacco in sports
stadiums, Cubs starting pitcher John Lackey stated, “[p]eople in the
78. DeLessio, supra note 6.  Although major league players are permitted by the MLB to use R
smokeless tobacco during the course of play, the MLB banned its use by minor league players in
1993. Id.
79. Weinbaum & Steele, supra note 36. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(a)(1)
(West 2017) (unlike many ordinances, the ban does not extend to fans attending the games).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(a)(3); DeLessio, supra note 6 (urging the MLB
to adopt a nationwide prohibition on the use of smokeless tobacco).
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118916(a)(3).
82. About the Campaign, Knock Tobacco Out of the Park, http://tobaccofreebaseball.org/con-
tent/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
83. Id.
84. Moore, supra note 65.
85. Id.
86. Jon Heyman, MLB Tried to Ban Smokeless Tobacco, But Players Union Balked, CBS
SPORTS (June 25, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-tried-to-ban-smokeless-to-
bacco-but-players-union-balked/ (stating that the “[t]he argument between [the] MLB . . . and its
players was said to have grown contentious at some point [during the negotiations]” and that the
MLB “pushed very hard” to ban smokeless tobacco, but the players union refused to accept any
agreement that prohibited smokeless tobacco use).
87. Id.; Gilgan, supra note 19, at 47.
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stands can have a beer, but we can’t do what we want?  That’s a little
messed up.”88  Players are not the only ones that disagree with the
ban.89  Chicago Cubs manager Joe Maddon stated, “I’m into personal
freedoms. . . . I don’t understand the point [of the smokeless tobacco
ban].  Just eradicate tobacco period if you’re going to go that route.”90
In Chicago, several highly influential politicians and sports figures
advocated for the ban of smokeless tobacco in sports stadiums.91  U.S.
Senator Dick Durbin, whose father passed away due to smoking-re-
lated lung cancer, has worked to limit the use of tobacco in the United
States.92  Senator Durbin supported Chicago Aldermen Edward Burk
and Patrick Daley Thompson when they proposed the bill to prohibit
smokeless tobacco in sports stadiums.93  One of Burk and Thompson’s
goals was to prevent children from imitating their role models on the
baseball field who use smokeless tobacco.94
Another reason lawmakers want to eliminate smokeless tobacco
use is because it provides free advertising for the big tobacco compa-
nies.95  Tobacco companies have targeted the MLB since 1891, but
with ever changing regulations, the companies have been required to
constantly adjust their advertising techniques.96  Before 1996, tobacco
companies provided players with free samples, utilized them in adver-
tisements, and provided them with smokeless tobacco.97  In 1996,
Congress granted the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) power
to regulate “sports sponsorships by the tobacco industry.”  As a result,
the FDA severely limited tobacco companies’ ability to advertise in
sports stadiums.98  Then, in 1998, MLB banned tobacco companies
from sending players free samples.99  Following these regulations,
88. DeLessio, supra note 6. R
89. See, e.g., Alec Brzezinski, Cubs Players Unhappy With Chicago’s Smokeless Tobacco Ban,
SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb/news/chicago-cubs-smoke
less-tobacco-ban-joe-maddon/14nnl3nrof1ar11zs11dmu5ups.
90. Id.
91. See Hal Dardick, Smokeless Tobacco Ban at Chicago Sporting Events a Step Closer to
Reality, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/
ct-durbin-smokeless-tobacco-met-0312-20160311-story.html (stating that U.S. Senator, Dick
Durbin, and Chicago Bulls and White Sox owner, Jerry Reinsdorf, encouraged Chicago alder-




95. Moore, supra note 65.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Bradford J. Patrick, Comment, Snuffing Out the First Amendment: The FDA Regulation of
Tobacco Company Advertising and Sports Sponsorships Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 139, 140–42 (1997).
99. Moore, supra note 65.
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player usage was the only form of advertising present in the
ballpark.100  Accordingly, the new legislation prohibiting smokeless
tobacco in baseball stadiums can be viewed as an attempt to eliminate
the free advertising that baseball players have provided big tobacco
companies for over 100 years.101
The death of hall of famer Tony Gwynn at age fifty-four from pa-
rotid gland cancer brought the smokeless tobacco issue back into the
spotlight.102  Tony Gwynn began using smokeless tobacco as a fresh-
man at San Diego State University and continued to use it throughout
his entire Major League career.103  Many, including his family, believe
his smokeless tobacco use caused the cancer that ultimately led to his
death.104  After Gwynn’s death his family filed suit against Altria
Group, Inc. alleging that it “preyed on Gwynn and others from a
young age and groomed them into lifelong customers while hiding the
toxic effects of their products.”105
E. Tobacco Education in the United States
Extensive research demonstrates that tobacco education is one of
the most effective ways to eliminate tobacco use.106  According to the
Surgeon General’s report from 2014, mass media campaigns, compre-
hensive community programs, and comprehensive statewide tobacco
control reduce the prevalence of tobacco use among youth and
adults.107  Furthermore, the CDC, the Surgeon General, and the Na-
tional Academy of Medicine agree that tobacco education programs
at all levels of schooling are essential to tobacco control.108  The CDC
100. Steven Martano, The Interwoven History of Baseball and Tobacco, HARDBALL TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.hardballtimes.com/the-interwoven-history-of-baseball-and-tobacco/.
101. Id.
102. Gilgan, supra note 19, at 45; Andrew Lawrence, Tony Gwynn’s Last Days: Cancer, To-
bacco and the Death of a Legend, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 2, 2016), http://www.si.com/mlb/
2016/06/02/tony-gwynn-cancer-san-diego-padres.
103. Des Bieler, Tony Gwynn’s Family Suing Tobacco Industry Over His Death From Cancer,
WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/05/23/
tony-gwynns-family-suing-tobacco-industry-over-his-death-from-cancer/?utm_term=.a103bb55cf
85.
104. Lawrence, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. Scientific Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Public Education Campaigns, CAMPAIGN
FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0371.pdf
(last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (“Scientific experts say the data clearly show that one of the best ways
to reduce tobacco use is an aggressive public education campaign.”).
107. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, 19 (2014) https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/stateandcommunity/best_practices/
pdfs/2014/comprehensive.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
108. Tobacco Control Funding, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, http://www2.aap.org/Richmond
Center/pdfs/IssueBrief_TobaccoControlFunding.pdf. (last updated Dec. 2015).
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states that mass media campaigns are the “best practice” for control-
ling tobacco use.109
Other studies also suggest that the most effective way to eliminate
tobacco use among children and young adults is through media cam-
paigns and school programs.110  A study conducted in Texas demon-
strated that there was a sixty percent reduction of tobacco use when
campaigns combined a high frequency of advertisements with school
programs.111  Some of the most effective educational campaigns target
the emotions of teenagers and children.112
Although educational programs are an effective way to prevent
teenagers from using tobacco many states lack funding for these pro-
grams.113  Even when states have the funding, they often fail to allo-
cate the funds to tobacco education.114  Accordingly, if schools wish to
obtain funding for tobacco education programs, they are often left
with no choice but to accept funds from big tobacco companies.115  It
is easier for schools to accept funding from the big tobacco companies
rather than raising funds through local governments or private fund-
ing.116  When schools accept funding from the big tobacco companies,
it is counter-productive because the big tobacco companies use it as
another opportunity to promote their image in the community.117  In
addition, the big tobacco companies utilize the opportunity to elimi-
nate any need for government funded anti-smoking measures.118
Therefore, to effectively educate today’s youth, it is important to util-
ize state funding.
109. Jennifer C. Duke et al., Youth’s Awareness of and Reactions to The Real Cost National
Tobacco Public Education Campaign, PLOS ONE (Dec. 17, 2015), http://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0144827.
110. M.C. Farrelly et al., Youth Tobacco Prevention Mass Media Campaigns: Past, Present,
and Future Directions, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL i35, i36–i37 (2003).
111. Id.
112. Id. at i41.
113. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, supra note 107, at 12.
114. Cary P. Gross et al., State Expenditures for Tobacco-Control Programs and the Tobacco
Settlement, 347 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1080, 1081 (2002) (“State governments in aggregate distributed
roughly $6.5 billion in settlement funds in 2001.  Approximately 6 percent of these funds were
devoted to tobacco control programs.”).
115. Tobacco-Free Funding Sources for School Anti-Smoking Programs, CAMPAIGN FOR TO-
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Equal Protection Challenges Brought by Smokeless
Tobacco Users and Smokers
Equal protection challenges are commonplace when laws attempt
to restrict an individual’s ability to use tobacco.119  Equal protection
challenges are brought under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution.120  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment states that no State shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”121  Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires all states to treat similarly situated persons in
the same manner.122  While the Fourteenth Amendment only applies
to states, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause holds the federal government to a similar standard.123
Because the smokeless tobacco bans are state or local regulations, an
individual challenging them must do so under the Fourteenth
Amendment.124
When analyzing an equal protection claim, a court must first deter-
mine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the statute or regu-
lation.125  The level of scrutiny the court applies depends on the type
of classification the statute creates.126  Suspect classifications, which
include classifications that are based on race, national origin, or that
involve a fundamental right, receive strict scrutiny.127  It is well estab-
lished that tobacco users are not a suspect class entitled to the utmost
protection under the Equal Protection Clause.128  Since tobacco users
119. Gilgan, supra note 19, at 51 (detailing that one of the most common arguments for chal-
lenging tobacco regulations is that tobacco users are a suspect class entitled to special protection
under the Equal Protection Clause).
120. Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp. 2d 738, 746 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
122. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
123. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
124. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (alleging that a California property tax law
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v.
City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (alleging that a New York City
smoking ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
125. N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
126. Id. at 481.
127. Id. (explaining that a strict scrutiny analysis will uphold a law only if the government can
show that the law is narrowly tailored for furthering a compelling state interest).
128. See Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F. 3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that
smokers are not entitled to special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); N.Y.C.
C.L.A.S.H., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 482. (“Anti-smoking laws have never been recognized as
creating a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.”); Brashear v. Simms, 138 F. Supp. 2d 693, 694
(D. Md. 2001) (“[N]or is the classification between smokers and non-smokers a suspect one.”).
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are not a suspect class,129 the government is only required to satisfy
the rational basis standard.130  The rational basis standard merely re-
quires the government demonstrate the law furthers a legitimate state
interest.131  Generally, courts are unwilling to invalidate laws that reg-
ulate public health and welfare because ensuring each is a legitimate
state interest.132  Under this analysis, courts give substantial deference
to the government and typically uphold tobacco regulations.133
Equal protection challenges of smoking bans are largely unsuccess-
ful because states simply point to the fact that second-hand smoke has
negative health effects on other individuals.134  In N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H.,
Inc. v. City of New York, the Southern District of New York held that
smoking bans “serve to protect an important governmental interest—
the health and welfare of persons exposed to ETS [environmental to-
bacco smoke] in New York State.”135  Additionally, the court noted
that smokers are not a suspect class entitled to a heightened level of
scrutiny because smokers do not have immutable traits, a lack of polit-
ical power, or a history of unequal treatment.136  The N.Y.C.
C.L.A.S.H court applied the rational basis standard and found sub-
stantial evidence to support New York’s finding that secondhand
smoke posed a serious danger to individuals in enclosed areas.137
However, unlike smoking bans, the smokeless tobacco ban does not
simply target individual users, but it targets users in a particular sport
at a specific venue.138  In Chicago’s Journal of the Proceedings, the
city devotes a substantial portion of the proceedings to single out
baseball’s culture of tobacco use.139  The government has a legitimate
state interest in protecting children’s health, but is prohibiting athletes
from using the substance during games a rational way to address the
problem?
129. Gallagher, 699 F.3d at 1018.
130. See, e.g., Brashear, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (“[T]he act of smoking is entitled to only a
minimal level of protection under the Equal Protection Clause, as it is obviously not a funda-
mental right, nor is the classification between smokers and non-smokers a suspect one.”).
131. Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp. 2d 738, 746 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).
132. Id. at 747.
133. Gilgan, supra note 19, at 50.
134. See, e.g., Players, Inc. v. City of New York, 371 F. Supp. 2d 522, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
135. N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 497.
138. See Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, supra note 7, at
19,436.
139. Id.
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Contrary to smoking, smokeless tobacco contains no secondhand
health effects.140  Thus, lawmakers rely on the fact that professional
athletes are role models for children and young adults when justifying
restrictions on smokeless tobacco use.141  Legislators believe that
baseball players who use smokeless tobacco are negative role models
for young adults.142  Furthermore, the Tobacco Free Baseball Cam-
paign explicitly states that “[p]layers’ use of smokeless tobacco sets a
terrible example for millions of impressionable youth.”143  However,
legislators and advocates for the Tobacco Free Baseball Campaign fail
to consider that children’s role models are determined by their mind-
set.144  For example, someone with a growth mindset—individuals
who believe their intelligence can be developed—will choose positive
role models.145 There are also individuals predisposed to choosing role
models with undesirable habits. Meanwhile, individuals with a growth
mindset can learn through tobacco education, based on their belief in
developing their intelligence, that individuals who use smokeless to-
bacco are not the best role models.
While tobacco education reduces the chance that teenagers with a
growth mindset will use tobacco, states generally elect not to choose
this route because it requires state funding.146  States only provide
14.8% of the CDC’s recommended amount of funding for cessation
programs.147  If the lawmakers truly considered this to be a public
health concern, they would devote a substantial amount of funding to
the best method of prevention—education.  Additionally, states col-
lected $25.8 billion in tobacco revenue from the 1998 settlement with
the tobacco companies.148  Even though the states have funding, they
continue to decrease funds for tobacco prevention and cessation pro-
140. Melissa Conrad Sto¨ppler, Chewing Tobbaco (Smokeless Tobacco, Snuff), MEDICINENET
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.medicinenet.com/smokeless_tobacco/page3.htm (reporting that chew-
ing tobacco is safer for other people because smokeless tobacco does not emit second hand
smoke).
141. Weinbaum & Steele, supra note 36. R
142. See KNOCK TOBACCO OUT OF THE PARK, supra note 82.
143. Id.
144. Marilyn Price-Mitchell, How Role Models Influence Youth Strategies for Success, ROOTS
OF ACTION (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.rootsofaction.com/role-models-youth-strategies-success/
(explaining that teens are more likely to have positive role models when they maintain a growth
mindset as compared to a prevention mindset).
145. Carol Dweck, Carol Dweck Revisits the Growth Mindset, EDUCATION WEEK (Sept. 22,
2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/09/23/carol-dweck-revisits-the-growth-mindset
.html.
146. Prevention and Cessation Programs, CAMPAIGN FORTOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.
tobaccofreekids.org/what_we_do/state_local/prevention_cessation/ (last updated Dec. 15, 2017).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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grams.149  This is contrary to what many states promised to do when
they received the settlement from the big tobacco companies.150
In N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., the court noted that smoking bans in public
places singled out a particular class, but this alone was insufficient to
establish a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.151 Unlike the
bans on smoking, the smokeless tobacco ban does not simply target
individual users, but it targets users in a particular sport at a specific
venue.152  In Chicago’s Journal of the Proceedings, the city devotes a
substantial portion of the proceedings to single out baseball’s culture
of tobacco use.153
Nevertheless, in establishing an equal protection challenge, MLB
players face a substantial hurdle because they are not a suspect
class.154  The rational basis standard provides great deference to states
that attempt to enact laws concerning public health.155  Another sub-
stantial burden MLB players face in asserting an equal protection
challenge is the fact that localities are attempting to protect children
and teenagers from smokeless tobacco use.156  In society, children are
viewed as innocent individuals who need the utmost protection.157
For all of these reasons, players face an uphill battle if they decide to
allege that the ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Smokeless Tobacco Use by Major League Baseball Players as
an Expression Protected Under the First Amendment
For the purposes of this Section, only Chicago’s city ordinance will
be addressed to determine if it violates an individual’s right to free
speech under the First Amendment.158  Chicago Municipal Code
Chapter 7-32 states in pertinent part: “No person shall use smokeless
149. Id.
150. Id. (“The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids . . . issue[s] an annual report assessing
whether the states are adequately funding tobacco prevention and cessation programs, as many
states promised to do at the time of the tobacco settlement.”).
151. N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc v. City of New York., 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
152. See Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, supra note 7, at
19,436.
153. Id.
154. See Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp. 2d 738, 746 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).
155. Giligan, supra note 19, at 51.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Boston, New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco city ordinances will not be ex-
amined, but they would be assessed under a similar framework.
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tobacco at an event site for professional, collegiate, high school or or-
ganized amateur sporting events.”159
State and local governments are permitted to regulate the health
and welfare of citizens under the state’s police power granted by the
United States Constitution.160  However, a state regulation may be
preempted by the Supremacy Clause if Congress has specifically en-
acted legislation that regulates the subject matter.161  Many companies
affected by state and local tobacco regulations challenge them on
grounds that they are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act.162  The FCLAA granted Congress the power to
regulate and “establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with
cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship be-
tween smoking and health . . . .”163  In Lorillard Tobacco Co., the
Supreme Court noted that the FCLAA prevents states and localities
from enacting specific advertising restrictions on cigarettes, but they
could enact general zoning restrictions applicable to all advertise-
ments.164  The Court expressly stated that the FCLAA does not pro-
hibit all regulation concerning the sale and use of cigarettes.165
Additionally, the Court held the FCLAA only applied to cigarettes.166
Thus, smokeless tobacco companies could only challenge the constitu-
tionality of the advertising restriction under the First Amendment.167
Concerning the petitioner’s argument that the advertising restrictions
violated tobacco companies’ First Amendment rights, the Court ap-
plied the four-step Central Hudson Test.168  This test applies when as-
159. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-32-032 (2016).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, 731 F.3d 71,
78–79 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that a price ordinance that prohibited retailers from reducing to-
bacco prices did not violate First Amendment protections after nationwide tobacco retailers
challenged the ordinance’s validity).
161. Rockwood v. Burlington, 21 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (D. Vt. 1998).
162. See id.; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (holding that
Massachusetts regulations concerning outdoor and point-of-sale advertising were preempted by
the FCLAA); Jones v. Vilsack, 272 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001) (arguing that Iowa’s Tobacco
Use Prevention and Control Act was preempted by the FCLAA); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Out-
lets v. Worcester, 851 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Mass. 2012).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
164. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (“Although the FCLAA pre-
vents States and localities from imposing special requirements or prohibitions ‘based on smoking
and health’ ‘with respect to the advertising or promotion’ of cigarettes, that language still leaves
significant power in the hands of States to impose generally applicable zoning regulations and to
regulate conduct.”).
165. Id. at 552.
166. Id. at 553.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 554 (describing the four elements as: (1) whether the speech is protected by the
First amendment; (2) whether the governmental interest is substantial; (3) if the first two receive
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sessing whether a regulation unconstitutionally restricts a company’s
commercial speech.169  For professional baseball players, the Central
Hudson Test does not apply because an individual’s freedom of ex-
pression does not fall within the commercial framework.170
In N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., the Court analyzed whether a person’s right
to smoking was considered a form of speech.171  In deciding the issue,
the Court noted that the mere act of smoking was not considered a
form of speech, but it could receive protection under the First Amend-
ment as an expression.172  Expressions are protected under the First
Amendment if there is an intent to convey a particular message and if
the message will be understood by those who view it.173  Under this
framework, the Southern District of New York concluded that a per-
son smoking in a bar or restaurant was not conveying a particular
message because the “non-expressive purpose subsumes whatever ex-
pressive message may be inferred.”174  In regard to the smokeless to-
bacco ban, courts may consider it to be an expression entitled to First
Amendment protection because baseball players are public figures
that convey messages through their actions.175
When a baseball player uses smokeless tobacco, it forms a noticea-
ble bulge in the player’s lip or cheek.176  The player is not actually
expressing words, but he is arguably expressing his right to use a legal
substance.177  Further, the player must be conveying a message to chil-
dren if the legislature imposed the ban because using smokeless to-
affirmative answers, whether the regulation advances the governmental interest; and (4) whether
the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary).
169. Kristin M. Sempeles, The FDA’s Attempt to Scare the Smoke Out of You: Has the FDA
Gone Too Far with the Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels?, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 223, 227
(2012); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)
(defining commercial speech as “relat[ing] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience”).
170. See Lora E. Barnhart Driscoll, Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A Rationale for Sim-
plifying and Clarifying the First Amendment’s Protections for Nonpolitical Advertisements, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 213, 213–14 (2011) (“Courts use the Central Hudson test to decide
whether a proposed governmental regulation of non-misleading advertisements for lawful activi-
ties violates the First Amendment.”).
171. N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
172. Id.
173. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410–11 (1974).
174. N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
175. Weinbaum & Steele, supra note 36. R
176. See generally Jeff Passan, How New Laws Banning Chewing Tobacco Could Change
MLB, YAHOO (Apr. 15, 2016, 10:55 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/how-new-laws-banning-
chewing-tobacco-could-change-mlb-155514726-mlb.html; Nada Tawfik, Baseball’s Toxic Tradi-
tion of Chewing Tobacco, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-30935685.
177. Weinbaum & Steele, supra note 36.
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bacco sends the wrong message to children.  What message players are
conveying would need to be determined by the players themselves.
The players may be sending a negative message to children, but the
First Amendment protects an individual’s right to convey those nega-
tive messages.178
Assuming that a player’s use of smokeless tobacco is considered an
expression, a state or local government may only limit that right if the
restriction is justified by clear public interest.179  In regard to smoke-
less tobacco, lawmakers justified the restriction by arguing that base-
ball players are role models to children.180  Lawmakers further
justified the ban by citing the increase in smokeless tobacco use
among teenagers.181  To survive a First Amendment challenge,
lawmakers’ justifications must contain no reference to “the content of
the regulated speech, [be] narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for
communication.”182
When applying this test, courts first assesses whether the restriction
or ordinance is content-neutral.183  “Restrictions on speech are con-
tent-neutral if they are ‘justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.’”184  Furthermore, when assessing whether the
law is content-neutral, courts address whether the government dis-
agreed with the message that the expression or speech conveyed.185
Here, the city of Chicago specifically enacted the ordinance because it
disagreed with the message smokeless tobacco use by professional
baseball players conveyed to teenagers and young children.186  The
councilmen attempted to shield the ordinance from any scrutiny by
labeling it as a public health ordinance, but in essence, the councilmen
178. N.Y.C. C.L.A.S.H., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 478.  Courts have found a protectable expres-
sion when a person burns the American flag.  In that instance, the person has a desire to make a
political statement.
179. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529–30 (1945).
180. KNOCK TOBACCO OUT OF THE PARK, supra note 82.
181. Weinbaum & Steele, supra note 36.
182. Weinberg v. Chicago, 310 F. 3d 1029, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002).
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
185. Id.
186. Smokeless Tobacco Use Prohibited at Sports Event Sites, CHI. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T,
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdph/supp_info/tabacco_alcohol_drug_abuse/smoke-
less-tobacco-use-prohibited-at-sports-event-sites.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (“According to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, children look up to and emulate the behavior of
professional baseball players and other athletes.  The aim of this ordinance is to protect young
people from using smokeless tobacco.”).
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disagreed with the lifestyle choices of the baseball players.187  Further-
more, the councilmen specifically targeted MLB players even though
the ordinance bans smokeless tobacco use at all sporting events.188
The specific reference to MLB players in the title of the ordinance
demonstrates this.189
In addition to disagreeing with the message that it conveys, the or-
dinance is not narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government
interest.  In Weinberg v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit found
Chicago’s ordinance banning the sale of merchandise within 1000 feet
of the United Center without a license was not narrowly tailored to
achieve a legitimate government interest.190  The court found that
maintaining pedestrian traffic flow was a legitimate government inter-
est.191  However, the court held the ordinance was not narrowly tai-
lored because the city failed to provide any evidence that a restriction
of 1000 feet maintained traffic flow.192  In fact, there was video evi-
dence that showed no increase in traffic when pedestrians sold mer-
chandise outside the United Center.193
Like in Weinberg, the city failed to provide any evidence that
smokeless tobacco use by MLB players during games increased the
likelihood that a teenager would use smokeless tobacco.194  The ordi-
nance attempts to regulate public health by protecting children from
the adverse health effects of smokeless tobacco.195  However, the
means utilized to achieve the legitimate state interest target a small
group of individuals that have little impact on the decisions of chil-
dren.196  There is substantial evidence suggesting teenagers tend to use
tobacco products because they lack proper education on the adverse
187. Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, supra note 7, at
19,436.
188. See CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE 7-32-032(a) (2016).
189. The ordinance is titled: Use of smokeless tobacco at sites for professional and amateur
baseball and other sporting events prohibited. Id.
190. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F. 3d 1029, 1040 (7th Cir. 2002).
191. Id. at 1038.
192. Id. at 1039.
193. Id. at 1038.
194. See Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, supra note 7, at
19,436.
195. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (stating that a restriction on First
Amendment liberties must be supported by a clear danger to the public interest).
196. Weinbaum & Steele, supra note 36 (reporting that only twenty-five to thirty percent of R
MLB players use smokeless tobacco).  While MLB players are role models for children, the best
and most effective way to prevent today’s youth from using smokeless tobacco is through educa-
tion and mass media campaigns.  Farrelly et al., supra note 110, at i45.
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health effects.197 Although the existence of alternative measures is not
dispositive,198 it demonstrates that the regulation is not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the goal of reducing the number of children and teen-
agers who use smokeless tobacco.  For a regulation to satisfy the
narrowly tailored requirement, “the government must demonstrate al-
ternative measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to
achieve the government’s interest.”199  Under this standard, the
smokeless tobacco ordinance fails the narrowly tailored requirement
because tobacco education is a far more effective mean of reducing
smokeless tobacco use and it does not impinge a player’s speech.200
Lastly, a regulation must provide ample alternative channels for
communication.201  An ordinance violates this requirement, if it pre-
vents all communication by the speaker to one particular audience.202
The Chicago ordinance does not provide an alternative channel for
communication because it restricts a player’s tobacco use during the
game.  If the expression the player hopes to convey is his right to use a
legal substance during the game, the ban completely silences the base-
ball player’s message.203  In fact, this message cannot be conveyed
outside of a game, because the player is not restricted in his use of
smokeless tobacco while he is not playing.  Therefore, the councilmen
silence the message that baseball players convey when using smoke-
less tobacco during baseball games, which deprives the players of any
channel to communicate their message.204
In conclusion, Chicago’s smokeless tobacco ordinance is not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the government’s legitimate state interest in
protecting public health. Furthermore, it fails to provide alternative
channels for the players to communicate their desire to use smokeless
tobacco during games. Accordingly, the smokeless tobacco ordinance
should be held unconstitutional because it violates the player’s right to
freedom of expression.
197. Farrelly et al., supra note 110, at i37 (finding that controlled experiments demonstrate
that anti-tobacco advertising campaigns can decrease the level of tobacco use in youth).
198. See Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 673, 698 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
199. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014).
200. See infra notes 221–238 and accompanying text.
201. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002).
202. Id. at 1041.
203. See Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, supra note 7, at
19,436.
204. Id.
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IV. IMPACT: TOBACCO EDUCATION IS NECESSARY TO REDUCE
SMOKELESS TOBACCO USE
The smokeless tobacco ban in sports stadiums has yet to be decided
in court, but when the issue is decided, it has the potential to set a
lasting precedent.  Since the government began regulating tobacco use
in the 1960s, several regulations have been enacted to decrease to-
bacco use in the United States.205  However, tobacco use is still a seri-
ous public health concern legislators are attempting to eliminate.206
Even though constitutional hurdles exist,207 legislators continuously
enact regulations to eliminate tobacco use.208  Given the fact that leg-
islators refuse to completely ban tobacco,209 the best alternative is to
educate the public of the harmful effects of tobacco use.210  Therefore,
when the issue is decided, the court can recognize that legislators must
use more effective means to decrease tobacco use rather than enacting
regulations that target a small group of individuals.
The smokeless tobacco ban attempts to limit children’s exposure to
smokeless tobacco use on television and in person.211 However, if a
baseball player’s use of smokeless tobacco is considered harmful to
children’s health, a parent may restrict the child from viewing baseball
games.212  If parents do not want to restrict their child’s access to view
baseball games, then they could educate them on smokeless to-
bacco.213  It is also important to note that youth participation in base-
ball has steadily declined over the past twenty years.214  This runs
contrary to the legislators’ argument that baseball players using
smokeless tobacco has caused an increase in tobacco use amongst
205. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. R
206. Blake, supra note 31. R
207. See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 548 (6th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the Family Smoking Prevention Act ban on Company advertisement was overly
broad and in violation of free speech).
208. Blake, supra note 31. R
209. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(d)(3) (2012); U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York,
708 F.3d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 2013).
210. Scientific Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Public Education Campaigns, supra note
106. R
211. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. R
212. See Adam Thierer, FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information
Age, J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Feb. 2009, at 143 (2009).
213. See Jessica J. Collins, The Bogeyman of “Harm to Children”: Evaluating the Government
Interest Behind Broadcast Indecency Regulation, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1225,  1251–52 (2010).
214. Marc Fisher, Baseball is Struggling to Hook Kids—and Risks Losing Fans to Other
Sports, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/nationals/baseballs-
trouble-with-the-youth-curve—and-what-that-means-for-the-game/2015/04/05/2da36dca-d7e8-
11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html?utm_term=.e4a80cb4d725.
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teenagers.215  How can councilmen and legislators explain a decline in
youth baseball viewership with an increase in youth smokeless to-
bacco use?  Simply put, they cannot.
One explanation for the ban is that legislators do not want to pro-
vide funding for tobacco education programs.216  In May 2004, the
CDC reported that state funding for tobacco control programs had
decreased by twenty-eight percent over the prior two years.217  Addi-
tionally, the report indicated that as of January 2004, only four states
spent the recommended amount of funding on tobacco control pro-
grams.218  These statistics support the argument that the lack of to-
bacco education has caused the increase of smokeless tobacco use
among today’s youth.219
Tobacco education programs are a way to reduce smokeless tobacco
use without taking away an individual’s right to use the substance.220
First, tobacco education programs substantially decrease an individ-
ual’s likelihood of using tobacco products.221  If states placed more
emphasis on this effective alternative, it would lead to a decrease in
smokeless tobacco use without impinging on personal freedoms.222
While legislators point to the cost of tobacco education programs, this
argument fails because it does not adequately consider ways to fund
the programs.223  In 1998, as part of the Master Settlement Agree-
ment, the five largest tobacco companies agreed to pay states approxi-
mately $10 billion annually.224  As part of the agreement, states
promised to allocate a substantial portion of the settlement money
towards tobacco programs.225  However, the states have failed to ful-
fill this obligation.226
215. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. R
216. Sustaining State Funding for Tobacco Control, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/program_development/sustaining-
states/pdfs/factsFinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (noting that communities that reduce their tobacco control spending see dramatic
increases in tobacco use).




223. See Sustaining State Funding for Tobacco Control, supra note 216.
224. Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., http://www.publichealthlawcenter
.org/topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation/master-settlement-agreement (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017).
225. Broken Promises to Our Children: A State-by-State Look at the 1998 State Tobacco Settle-
ment 18 Years Later, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.tobac-
cofreekids.org/microsites/statereport2017/.
226. Id.
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The settlement money is not the only source of income that states
can utilize to support tobacco education programs.227  In 2003, state
governments collected nearly $19 billion in tobacco-generated reve-
nue.228  According to the CDC, it would take only 8.2% of this reve-
nue to fully fund every state’s tobacco education program.229  In
addition, a more recent report by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids indicates that states will collect $26.6 billion in tobacco revenue
in 2017, but only 1.8% of that revenue will go towards funding to-
bacco education programs.230  While states receive a substantial
amount of money from settlements and tobacco-generated revenue,
they continuously fail to provide adequate tobacco education.231  In
addition to creating revenue for the programs, the excise tax can serve
as a deterrent to tobacco use.232  Research suggests that increasing to-
bacco prices effectively reduces tobacco use among all ages.233  More
importantly, an increase on smokeless tobacco prices reduces use
among young males.234
The smokeless tobacco bans fail to address the problems that have
caused an increase in smokeless tobacco use among teenagers.  Rather
than ban smokeless tobacco at sports stadiums, an increase in funding
for tobacco education programs and an increase on taxes for smoke-
less tobacco will reduce smokeless tobacco use among today’s
youth.235
V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco use will continue to be a problem until legislators decide to
properly educate the public on the adverse health effects that arise
from its use.236  Over the past twenty years, states have received a
substantial amount of money from tobacco settlements and tobacco
taxes.  However, only a small portion of this money has gone to to-
227. Id.
228. See Sustaining State Funding for Tobacco Control, supra note 216.
229. Id.
230. Broken Promises to Our Children, supra note 225.
231. Id.
232. G. Emmanuel Guindon et al., The Impact of Prices and Taxes on the Use of Tobacco
Products in Latin America and the Caribbean, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e9, e10 (2015).
233. Id. (confirming that higher cigarette prices can reduce cigarette use and finding that
higher prices can delay experimentations with cigarettes by youths).
234. Raise Cigarette Taxes Reduces Smoking, Especially Among Kids, CAMPAIGN FOR TO-
BACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0146.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017).
235. See supra notes 215–234 and accompanying text.
236. Scientific Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Public Education Campaigns, supra note
106.
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bacco education.237  As a result, there has been a substantial increase
in smokeless tobacco use among today’s teenagers.238  Although states
and cities point the finger at baseball players, their failure to properly
allocate funds to tobacco education programs is the source of the
problem.  Until lawmakers increase tobacco education funding, the in-
crease in smokeless tobacco use will continue.  Furthermore, it is
likely that legislators will continue to enact legislation that impinges
upon an individual’s right to use a legal substance.  Legislators must
combat health issues by going to the source of the problem, a lack of
education, rather than impinging on an individual’s right to use a legal
substance.
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237. Broken Promises to Our Children, supra note 225.
238. Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 13.
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